"Триумф искусства и техники. Ни один корабль в мире не достигал еще такого!" Отзыв Чарльза Крампа о первом круге испытаний "Варяга". При волнение моря в 10 баллов крейсер "Варяг" показывает мировой рекорд для крейсеров своего класса по скорости - 24,59 узла.

Причины и предпосылки Были ли у России военные секреты?
Прочитал на днях книжку Ремингтона, изданную в 1905 году, по горячим следам. Книга написана по материалам прессы. Товарищу еще неизвестно даже о гибели Яшимы. Но зато сведений о русской армии навалом, причем такие подробности, что я онемел. Например, глава CHAPTER III† RUSSIAN TROOPS, REINFORCEMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS Ccылка †" From The Times of February 2, 1904." THE reports received from several correspondents of The Times who ,are in a position to supply accurate information, enable us to advance a step towards penetration of the customary veil of mystery which enshrouds the proceedings of Russian armies in the field. Until evidence is given to disprove the very complete and remarkable summary of the Russian forces east of Lake Baikal sent by the Peking correspondent of The Times on January 21,‡ the estimate of numbers therein given holds the field. Reckoning up the available troops of all arms, the correspondent placed the nominal strength on the date given at 150,000 men and 266 guns. His telegram must be regarded as a tour de force in the art of military intelligence, and as a model of accurate and concise reporting. ‡ PEKING, January 21. The following corrected list of the Russian military forces in the Far East to date comprises all the troops east of Lake Baikal in Siberia and Manchuria, including those guarding the whole of the Manchuriau railways and the railways between Vladivostok and Khabarovka, and those guarding the Amur River, and the troops on shore at Vladivostok, Possiet Bay, Dalny, and Port Arthur. The total strength at the present moment in this vast region consists, inclusive of the frontier or railway guard, of 3,115 officers, 147,479 men, and 266 guns. The infantry, numbering 2,100 officers and 105,829 men, consists in the first place of 32 regiments of East Siberian Rifles, each with 39 officers and 1,906 men. Each regiment has one company of mounted infantry. There are also four regiments of regular army infantry from Russia, Nos. 123, 124, 139, and 140, consisting of 16 battalions with 312 officers and 15,248 men; also 16 battalions of infantry field reserve with 252 officers and 15,300 men ; also one battalion and one company of fortress infantry from Nikolaievsk with 20 officers and 1,186 men. The two battalions of Port Arthur fortress infantry recently became the 29th Regiment, and the six battalions of Vladivostok fortress infantry became the 30th, 31st, and 32nd Regimentsof East Siberian Rifles. The frontier guard infantry, 55 companies with 268 officers and 13,103 men, make up the total of the infantry. Of cavalry there are 148 squadrons, with 603 officers and 21,914 men, made up of six regular cavalry squadrons from Russia, 87 squadrons of Trans-Baikal Cossacks, and 55 frontier guard squadrons. The artillery consists of 36¼ batteries, with 266 guns. There are 15 field batteries of eight guns each and one of six guns ; four horse batteries of six guns each ; two mountain batteries of eight guns each and one of six guns ; one heavy battery of eight guns ; one horse mountain section with two guns ; also six batteries with six quick-firers each ; also six frontier guard batteries of eight guus each. Each battery consists of six officers and 242 men. There are also two battalions of garrison artillery at Vladivostok and two at Port Arthur, consisting of 16 companies with 42 officers and 2,620 men ; also one company at Nikolaievsk. The total artillery force is 264 officers and 10,567 men. The engineers comprise 22 companies with 88 officers and 3,745 men— namely, two battalions of East Siberian Engineers, including a telegraph company; the 4th Trans-Amur railway battalion (not four battalions as reported) ; also the Ussuri railway brigade ; also the Port Arthur engineer company, besides one submarine mining company at Nikolaievsk and another at Vladivostok ; also a balloon section. The supply transport comprises 60 officers and 5,423 men. In reading these figures it is necessary to remember and to understand certain facts about the Russian position. First, the line of communications between Manchuria and Western Siberia consists of a single line of lightly constructed railway ; secondly, the Manchurian Railway, which is somewhat exposed to wreckage, traverses for 1,555 miles an unfriendly country whose people may possibly regard the Japanese as liberators : thirdly, the total strength given represents the full war strength and assumes that not a single man is sick or absent nor a single gun disabled. All the Russian fleet, except four armoured cruisers at Vladivostok, is at present at Port Arthur, wedged in a confined harbour, or rather basin, with only one dock available for repairs. Война еще не началась, а журналистам уже все о русской армии известно. И зачем нужны японцам шпионы?

Ответов - 44, стр: 1 2

Обычно атташе читали газеты, а потом передавали в Россию содержание или свое мнение. invisible Дурдом ОДНАКО!
cobra пишет: Дурдом ОДНАКО Ну почему? И сейчас разведки многое узнают из прессы. Есть целые аналитические отделы. Кстати кроме чтения инфу добывали по личным связям и слухам.
asdik пишет: Ну почему? И сейчас разведки многое узнают из прессы. Есть целые аналитические отделы. Кстати кроме чтения инфу добывали по личным связям и слухам. Да какие там аналитические отделы! Самомнение о японцах, как о макаках довлело над любой полученной информацией: We were fond of their productions, of which the delicate workmanship and brilliant color enchanted us. Our services spoke with appreciation of the country and its inhabitants and was full of pleasant reminiscences of their visits, especially of Nagasaki, where they appeared to be popular with the inhabitants. As a military factor Japan did not exist. Our sailors, travelers, and diplomats have entirely overlooked the awakening of an energetic, independent people. This was less than fair to the highly perceptive, if unrecognized, reporting by Baron Roman Romanovitch Rosen, the Russian minister in Tokyo. But the Russians, it is true, were deplorably served by their staff at general headquarters and many of their attaches. A handbook, updated each year, gave all available details about the Japanese armed forces, but often reports from Japan by military attaches and others were pigeonholed when they arrived at headquarters. Two major reports in 1903, including one dealing with the formation of Japanese reserves, were both extremely well-informed and important. When the reports reached the Russian general staff, senior officers dismissed them as alarmist and unreliable. As a result, on the eve of the war, the Russians had no information that they regarded as reliable, or credible, about Japanese reserves. The number of fighting men Japan could put into the field was therefore greatly underestimated. Worse, it was generally accepted that one Russian soldier was the equal of three Japanese. Even at the time Kuropatkin was in Japan, the Russian military attache assured him that Japan could put into the field only ten of its thirteen divisions. Of the country's 400,000 reserves and troops assigned to work of a sedentary nature in the army's various depots, he knew nothing. A single officer on the Russian general staff was alone detailed to Japanese intelligence. "And unfortunately," Kuropatkin noted, "our selection was bad." Russian military observers at a Japanese naval review at Kobe in April 1903 reported that the officers and crews were ill-trained and would not pass an operational test. The military opinions picked up by Bezobrazov from men like Major-General Vogak and passed on to the Tsar were even more irresponsible. Vogak, who was concurrently senior military attache in Peking and Tokyo, was openly contemptuous of the Japanese army, and, in the closing days of 1903, brought his uninformed opinions to bear on Alexeiev, who emerges from the scene pathetically—opposed to war but encouraged and misled by others who deceived him as they deceived the Tsar.
invisible пишет: Самомнение о японцах, как о макаках довлело над любой полученной информацией Ну так дело разведки предоставить информацию, а уж как её использовать решают властьпридержащие. Сколько, к примеру, копий сломали в рассуждениях, что ВИС докладывали о реальной дате начала "Барбароссы"